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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the victims’ rights movement swept the country in the 1970s, leading
to the addition of victims’ rights amendments to the constitutions of thirty-two
states starting in the 1980s, the victim’s “voice” has been a source of great anxiety
in debates about criminal sentencing.1 The victim impact statement (VIS) has been
lauded as a means of empowerment,2 decried as a vehicle for unrestrained
vengeance,3 defended in the interests of truth, healing, and reconciliation,4 and
lambasted as irrelevant to the very purposes of punishment.5 From cable television

* Olin-Searle Fellow in Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Marshall
Alcorn, Andrew Bradt, Dan Markel, and Lee Otis for their comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
1. See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6.01; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, §
2.1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a; CONN. CONST. amend. art. XXIX;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST.
art. 1, § 13(b); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15; LA. CONST. art. I, § 25; MD. CONST. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS art. 47; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 26-A; MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34;
OR. CONST. art. I, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. I,
§ 35; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m. For historical background on the victims’ rights
movement, see DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3–43 (2d ed. 2006).
2. See, e.g., Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements
as Victim Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, 1999 CRIM. L. REV. 545, 551.
3. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361, 398 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 124 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV.
937, 986–1006 (1985).
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coverage of tabloid show trials to testimony at United Nations proceedings, we are
surrounded by the voices of victims speaking in judicial settings and those voices
have been assigned an ever-increasing significance in punishing crime.6 The
supporters and detractors of victim impact statements tend to face off across a
bright line that puts the rights of the defendant and those of the victim into
competition with one another, with the vindication of the former frequently
conceptualized as a curtailment of the latter, and vice versa. For example, some
critics argue that the subjectivity of victim narratives undermines certainty in legal
processes, to the detriment of defendants.7 Others characterize victim impact
statements as proceduralizing a base impulse of vengeance against the defendant,8
or an immutable identity of helplessness for the victim.9 Many critics accept the
introduction of subjective narratives into criminal proceedings in general, but
object to the specific policy ramifications of including those of the victim at the
time of sentencing.10 Even scholars who discuss the “representative character” of
victim testimony conceive of this character as primarily a rhetorical strategy
devised by the state to justify increased police power by encouraging an “it-couldbe-you” attitude toward victims on the part of jurors.11 And for their part,
supporters of the statements point to “therapeutic” benefits for victims, and the
“fairness” of letting three discrete entities—“the State, the defendant and the
victim”—be heard, as though the three occupy wholly separate spheres.12
This article will challenge the terms of the current debate, to show how the
narratives of individuals legitimate the inherently collective exercise of
punishment.13 Specifically, I contend that the complexity of a victim narrative

6. See HANS BOUTELLIER, CRIME AND MORALITY: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN POST-MODERN CULTURE 47 (2000) (“Without exaggeration, the reinforced
position of the victim is the most important post-war development in the practice of criminal
law.”); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 121 (2002) (“[T]he aim of serving victims has become part of the
redefined mission of all criminal justice agencies.”).
7. See, e.g.¸ Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and
Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 145 (1999).
8. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 106 (2007);
Bandes, supra note 3, at 396–98.
9. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1426
(1993).
10. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 3, at 409 (“[N]ot every story should be told, or every
voice heard . . . . We do not need elaborate structures to assist us in feeling fear, pain, and
grief for those like us who have suffered violence at the hands of the other. This is already
the dominant narrative of the criminal trial.” (citation omitted)); Kenji Yoshino, The City
and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1884 (2005).
11. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 11; see also Jonathan Simon, Fearless Speech in the
Killing State: The Power of Capital Crime Victim Speech, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1377, 1383
(2004).
12. Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611,
611–12 (2009) (emphasis in original).
13. Much of the scholarship on victim statements has focused on the specific context of
capital trials, given the heightened scrutiny given to the procedural rights of defendants
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effectively conveys the social experience of harm, without which the criminal
justice system loses its legitimacy as a penal authority. In other words, we cannot
only consider “the victim,” “the defendant,” and “the state” as three separate
entities vying for narrative control over accounts of harm in determining
punishment. Rather, the stories of the victims and defendants already circulate
through society outside of the courtroom, and the function of “the state” in the trial
context is to vindicate the interests of this society. Notions about criminal “harm”
enter the culture through the experiences of individuals, as well as through political
rhetoric and media representations, and, once there, shape social norms about the
assignment of blame. Therefore, if the sentencing process cannot accommodate the
stories of actual harm to individual victims it runs the risk of (a) coming to be
viewed as illegitimate to a society guided by these norms, or (b) allowing free rein
for generic representations of criminal harm produced by political and media actors
to take the place of individuated victim accounts in the mind of a fact finder. In the
former situation, as empirical research has shown, we run the risk of a system less
effective at preventing crime.14 In the latter, we skew the operative images of
victim and criminal even closer toward the crude clichés feared by critics of the
statements.
This article will proceed in four parts. Part I will summarize the legal history of
victim impact statements and the existing debate over their appropriateness in the
sentencing context. I will argue that much of the literature focuses on a tripartite
competition between victim, defendant, and state, which has the tendency to ignore
the capacity for a victim impact statement to externalize and convey the social
harm of a criminal act. In Part II, through textual analysis of how a group of actual
victim impact statements convey individual suffering to an institutional audience, I
will demonstrate the unique complexity of the harm they narrate. I will show that
while critics’ concerns over the capacity of subjective narratives to yield
undifferentiated antipathy and lapses into trope language of “victimhood” are in
fact justified by reality, other features allow these narratives to get at the nuanced
truth of suffered harm and its context in the social world protected by the criminal
justice system. The model that emerges from this analysis reveals a deep tension
between narrative authorities in the structure of victim impact testimony. On the
one hand, the victim has the potential to overcome the monopoly on narrative
previously held by the trial attorneys, as well as some of the signification problems
identified in the theoretical literature, to develop uniquely subjective accounts of
harm through some of the techniques I identify. On the other, the victims’ sheer
facing the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave
as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must
be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action.”). The Supreme Court’s original prohibition of victim impact statements was
explicitly limited to capital trials because “the considerations that inform the [capital]
sentencing decision may be different from those that might be relevant to other liability or
punishment determinations.” Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 n.12 (1987), overruled
by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Because the focus of this article is on the
nature of testified suffering in general, my analysis applies to victim statements in capital
and non-capital contexts alike; where the distinction is relevant I will so indicate.
14. See infra Part III.A.
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consciousness of their own bodies and identities as potentially transformed by the
defendant, and the continuing consciousness of the court’s authority to assign
meaning to these transformations, has the tendency to subvert the victims’ authority
as subjective authors of their own experiences.
From these observations I conclude that a victim impact statement does not
function purely as a means of deploying negative emotion toward the defendant,
nor as a free-floating platform for empowerment for the victim. Instead, the
statement conveys suffering along a temporal trajectory that runs from the original
experience of harm to include the relationships between the several parties and the
criminal justice process itself, in a way that the other narratives of a criminal trial
could not otherwise accomplish. Whether these statements are appropriate vehicles
for expressing legally relevant “harm,” then, relates to the function of the criminal
system as a means of dispersing collective sanctions for violations of communal, as
well as individual, welfare. If the victim remains at least partially objectified as an
individual by the act of testimony, and if that testimony allows her to represent
harm to the fact finder through mutual recourse to culturally circulating objects,
then one purpose served by her “voice” must be to provide information about the
collective harm flowing from the defendant’s acts.
Throughout Part II, I will illustrate my analysis with case studies drawn from
victim impact statements made at the 2005 trial of Zayad Al Safarini, one of the
perpetrators of the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan.
Because of the sheer quantity of statements made during the course of Safarini’s
sentencing, this particular trial provides an opportunity to begin to identify qualities
common to testified accounts of suffering. Applying the theoretical materials to
these statements, I will show how this group of victim witnesses confronts and
seeks to negotiate the challenges of representing their suffering as they felt it,
focusing on their tendency to use non-chronological timeframes as a means of
expressing visceral experience, their symbolic displacement of suffering onto a
variety of external objects, and their centering of the victim’s body in an object
relationship15 to both the defendant and the court itself.
In Part III, I will integrate sociological and cultural studies scholarship on the
expression of suffering and the relationship between individual and cultural
memory to argue that focusing on the balance of interests between victim and
defendant ignores the importance of the collective experience of criminal harm to
the goals of punishment. I will first discuss the criminal justice system itself as a
collective social endeavor, focusing on the philosophical history of criminal harm
conceived of as actions against society in general, and the role of that society—
especially through the institution of the jury—in punishing it. In thinking about the
societal interest and investment in punishment, I will consider both retributivist and
utilitarian theories of punishment, drawing upon the recent scholarship
demonstrating the utilitarian functions of “empirical desert” in punishment. I will
argue that even as individual memories have been found constitutive of cultural

15. Throughout this article, I will use the Kantian distinction between subject and
object—or that which perceives and that which is perceived—as a shorthand to indicate the
disparate power relations between the victim and the machinery of the trial process in the
production of legal truth.
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memory in other contexts such as the experience of war and epidemic, they have a
role to play in the cultural memory of criminality, which is an inescapable
backdrop to collective decision making about criminal punishment.
I will conclude in Part IV that—regardless of what one thinks of the balance of
power between victim and defendant created by the use of victim impact statements
—the ways in which they communicate suffering and, through suffering, legal
harm, have implications for collective decision making about the criminal law.
Policy decisions about the virtues and vices of these statements should not omit the
importance of societal experience of criminal harm to the former processes of
punishment that—in the absence of the specific content of individual memory—
could rely instead on general and stereotypical images of “crime,” which subvert
the dignity of both victim and defendant.
I. THE VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AND PUNISHMENT
The Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of victim testimony in
capital criminal sentencing on three occasions, with conflicting outcomes. In Booth
v. Maryland, a case arising from the slaying of an elderly couple during a burglary,
the defendant’s probation officer read the jury a prepared statement summarizing
the effects of the elderly couple’s murder on their children (including their son who
had discovered them bound and stabbed to death).16 In a 5-4 decision the Court
found the reading of the statement improper under the Eighth Amendment insofar
as its inclusion created an unacceptable risk that the death penalty would be
imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.17 In an opinion written by Justice
Powell, the Court found that, in its focus on the “character and reputation of the
victim and the effect on his family” rather than the defendant’s conduct, a victim
impact statement introduces factors that “may be wholly unrelated to the
blameworthiness of a particular defendant.”18 Because the defendant “often will not
know the victim” the Court reasoned, “[the defendant] therefore will have no
knowledge about the existence or characteristics of the victim’s family.”19
In South Carolina v. Gathers, the Court relied on Booth and reversed a death
sentence imposed in a case during which the prosecutor, in closing arguments, had
mentioned the victim’s possession on his person of a religious tract and a voter
registration card at the time of his death.20 Citing the requirement that punishment
be tailored to a defendant’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt,” the Court
concluded that where there was no evidence that respondent saw these papers, their
possession by the victim could not provide any information relevant to
respondent’s moral culpability.21
In Payne v. Tennessee, however, the Court reversed course and overruled Booth,
affirming the defendant’s death sentence for the murder of a woman and her two-

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
(1991).
21.

482 U.S. 496, 497–99 (1987).
Id. at 508–09.
Id. at 504.
Id.
490 U.S. 805, 807–08 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
Id. at 810–12 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
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year-old daughter despite testimony and commentary on the effects of these deaths
on a surviving three-year-old child whom the defendant had also attacked.22 In a 63 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment created no per se bar on victim impact evidence in a capital trial and
that such evidence is simply a means of informing the sentencing authority about
the extent of the harm flowing from the defendant’s act, the assessment of which
has “long been an important factor in determining the appropriate punishment.” 23
One question that emerges in the balance between Booth and Payne is how we
should understand “harm” to inform culpability. Payne seems to settle the question
in favor of a tort-like principle that a malfeasor must take his victim as he finds him
and is liable for even the unanticipated harm flowing from his misconduct.24 By the
reasoning of the Payne Court, victim testimony has the capacity to illustrate “quite
poignantly some of the harm that Payne’s killing had caused” and “there is nothing
unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind that harm at the same time as it
considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant.”25 As Paul Cassell
points out, “[H]armfulness—including harm to ‘the immediate victim’ and ‘family
members’—is obviously and uncontroversially a driving factor in making
blameworthiness decisions.”26 The difficulty is whether victim impact statements as
given are accurate or appropriate proxies for the underlying harm they purport to
convey.27 The scholarship in the wake of Payne has been largely critical of victim
impact statements for a number of reasons; to the extent that it has focused on their
narrative qualities it has seemed to imagine a kind of competitive relationship
between victim and defendant, with the rights of each balanced against one another,
and in which we determine the virtues and dangers of the statements by deciding
whether this balance is acceptable.28 These arguments all take into account the

22. 501 U.S. 808, 808–10 (1991).
23. Id. at 808.
24. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 299–300 (3d ed. 1964).
25. Payne, 501 U.S. at 826.
26. Cassell, supra note 12, at 629.
27. The conveyance of information for sentencing purposes is not the only justification
made for the use of VIS. Other common arguments include claims of psychological benefits
to both the defendant and victim and the opportunity to increase the defendant’s
understanding of his crime’s effects. See generally JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds.,
2003); Cassell, supra note 12, at 621–23; Erez, supra note 2, at 550–51. Because the subject
of this article is primarily the nature of harm conveyed for the purposes of punishment, I will
not dwell on these other effects at length.
28. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim Impact
Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545 (arguing that, in the capital context, victim impact
statements exacerbate the difficulty of a jury’s task of humanizing a defendant enough to
decide his fate, against the backdrop of pro-prosecution biases likely to exist at that phase in
the proceedings); Bandes, supra note 3, at 365 (arguing against victim impact statements
because they bring into the criminal context “inappropriate” emotions such as “hatred, the
desire for undifferentiated vengeance, and even bigotry”); Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim
Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 428–29 (1989) (arguing
that victim impact statements should only be permissible when the defendant had the intent
to cause the particular effects described, and when the testimony is not overly prejudicial,
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backdrop of the criminal defendant’s enshrined Sixth Amendment right to present
mitigating information on his own behalf, to which proponents of victim impact
statements point in order to argue that “fairness” requires that victims’ narratives
should also be taken into account.29
Professor Paul Gewirtz, for example, says that the defendant’s story and the
victim’s or survivor’s story “can be seen as counterstories, which should both be
available to the decisionmaker . . . . If particularized storytelling should have a
greater place in the law, does not the particularized story of the murder victim and
the victim’s survivors warrant that place?”30 In contrast, Susan Bandes argues that
the storytelling capacity of victim impact statements make them a vehicle for what
she considers lower order emotions directed against the defendant on behalf of the
victim. For Bandes, the statements “evoke not merely sympathy, pity, and
compassion for the victim, but also a complex set of emotions directed toward the
defendant, including hatred, fear, racial animus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated
vengeance, and the desire to purge collective anger.”31 Bandes views what she
considers a shift away from concern for the moral culpability of the individual as “a
thirst for undifferentiated vengeance,” characterizing the content of victim impact
statements as “irrelevant fortuities such as the social position, articulateness, and
race” of victims and their families.32 Furthermore, she conceives of the narratives
developed during the criminal trial as already stacked against the defendant by the
time sentencing takes place.33
Martha Minow opposes the introduction of victim evidence out of concern for
its encouragement of competing narratives of victimhood between the victim and
defendant, calling instead for normative standards to evaluate “historical harm”
experienced by oppressed groups as opposed to individuals.34 And Jennifer Culbert
sees the use of victim impact statements, in the death penalty context at any rate, as
an attempt to take a normative deontological stance on this competing relationship,
affirmatively establishing the suffering of the victim as one clear and
incontrovertible basis for deciding punishment in an otherwise pluralistic and
morally relativistic society.35 While all of these views highlight legitimate concerns
requiring that it be “submitted in a straightforward, factual way”); Elizabeth Lynett &
Richard Rogers, Emotions Overriding Forensic Opinions? The Potentially Biasing Effects of
Victim Statements, 28 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 449 (2000) (suggesting that victim accounts may
exert a biasing effect on criminal-forensic opinions).
29. United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1347 (D. Utah 2005).
30. Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial,
in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 135, 142–43 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996); see also Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?:
Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 26 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 431, 452 (2008) (“By giving victims a clear and uninterrupted voice at this
moment on par with that of defendants and prosecutors, a right to allocute signals both
society’s recognition of victims’ suffering and their importance to the criminal process.”).
31. Bandes, supra note 3, at 395 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 398; see also Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia’s Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 67, 123 (1992); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 89–
90 (1993).
33. See Bandes, supra note 3, at 400.
34. Minow, supra note 9, at 1437–38.
35. See Jennifer L. Culbert, The Sacred Name of Pain: The Role of Victim Impact
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about the ability of subjective narratives to unfairly prejudice the interests of one
party or another, they all focus on a specific view of sentencing as a kind of
gamesmanship in which the victim’s only function is to oppose the interests of the
defendant.
Even scholars who have more explicitly considered the victim’s “voice” as
implicating some form of collective interest have rejected those interests in the face
of powerfully constructed individuated roles. For example, Jonathan Simon has
recognized the state’s tendency, in recent years, to fetishize the “crime victim” as a
justification for conservative criminal legislation.36 He has explored the dangers of
this monolithic victim identity as an excuse for the exercise of state power,37 but
this formulation focuses so closely on a constructed victim that it neglects the
relationship between the diversity of actual victims and the societies in which they
take part (and against which this state-constructed victim is deployed).
Likewise, Kenji Yoshino has described victim impact statements as an instance
of the law’s “failed banishment of literature,” which he discusses by engaging
Plato’s archetypical exclusion of the poet from his ideal city.38 He accepts Plato’s
general propositions that “poetry” (or narrative) cannot be permitted to conflict
with the core functions of the state, cannot be defended solely on the basis of its
“ineradicability” from other textual practices such as law, and must rely on its
virtues to demonstrate that it does not conflict with core functions.39 For Yoshino,
victim impact statements cannot rely on the “ineradicability defense” because they
are “a discrete genre that can be banished from the trial” and “cannot be purely
redundant with other narratives in the trial.”40 And they fail to affirmatively defend
their “virtue” because, in the capital context at any rate, they do not serve the ends
of “fairness,” which Yoshino defines explicitly as allowing the defendant to assume
the “narrative posture . . . of a Scheherazade, telling stories to the state so she may
live . . . . untrammeled by other voices.”41
Yoshino’s argument is problematic for two reasons. First, his rejection of the
ineradicability defense is limited to the much easier functional separability of actual
victim statements from a proceeding, without addressing whether it is more
“virtuous” to allow the prosecutor-driven narratives that would remain to serve as
the final arbiters of truth against the defendant. Second, his rejection of the
statements boils down to a preference for a precise individuated role for the
defendant—that of Scheherazade. While this claim may well be justified by the
interests underlying the defendant-centered nature of criminal procedural
protections, particularly in a capital context (with the affirmative protections for
criminal defendants immutably enshrined in the Bill of Rights),42 it dismisses
without commentary all other affirmative claims to “virtue” that might be made on
behalf of victim impact statements as an instrument of state function (not unlike
Evidence in Death Penalty Sentencing Decisions, in PAIN, DEATH, AND THE LAW 103 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2004).
36. Simon, supra note 11, at 1383.
37. SIMON, supra note 8, at 75–110.
38. Yoshino, supra note 10, at 1839.
39. See id. at 1839–40, 1884.
40. Id. at 1879.
41. Id. at 1884 (footnote omitted).
42. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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Plato’s casual dismissal of the virtue defense of poetry in general, for which
Yoshino criticizes him). I argue, first, that removing victim impact statements from
a trial does not solve the “ineradicability problem” because other narratives—even
other crudely antidefendant narratives—will remain; they will simply exclude the
victim’s own more complicated account of her harm. Second, a strong virtue
defense exists on the basis that that complicated account of harm has systemic
social importance that cannot be wholly trumped by a defendant’s assumption of a
specific narrative posture.
It should be noted before moving on that, despite the many abstract normative
assumptions derived from these various role-driven assessments of victim impact
statements, from an empirical standpoint, there is relatively thin evidence of the
effects of the statements one way or another on outcomes in actual criminal
sentencing. The available empirical evidence on actual capital cases reveals no
significant effect.43 Simulated juror studies have shown some evidence of an effect
in capital cases,44 but not consistently,45 and it is unclear how accurately simulated
juries model the behavior of actual juries present for an entire trial and
deliberation.46 Particularly because of the challenges of data collection in any
quantitative attempt to study the collective effects of real victim impact statements
on any broad scale,47 it is helpful to drill more deeply into their qualitative structure
to consider how they are able to convey information to a fact finder.48

43. See Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’
Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 491–92.
44. See Edith Greene, Heather Koehring & Melinda Quiat, Victim Impact Evidence in
Capital Cases: Does the Victim’s Character Matter?, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 145
(1998); James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial:
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995); Bryan Myers, Draven
Godwin, Rachel Latter & Scott Winstanley, Victim Impact Statements and Mock Juror
Sentencing: The Impact of Dehumanizing Language on a Death Qualified Sample, 22 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 39 (2004). See generally Bryan Myers, Emalee Weidemann & Gregory
Pearce, Psychology Weighs In on the Debate Surrounding Victim Impact Statements and
Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors Really Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 13
(2006) [hereinafter Myers et al., Psychology] (providing open questions of victim statements,
addressed by Myers and his coauthors, based on psychological literature).
45. See Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race,
Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors:
A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1315 (1994) (finding the effects of
victim characteristics on jurors’ judgments to be inconsequential).
46. See Myers et al., Psychology, supra note 44, at 17 (“The decisions participants in a
jury simulation make hold no real consequences, and so it is difficult to extrapolate the
findings to real capital trials where the consequences are so grave.”); Mark Costanzo & Sally
Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase: Legal Assumptions,
Empirical Findings, and a Research Agenda, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 191 (1992)
(“[T]he very nature of the [death] penalty decision may render it an inappropriate topic for
jury simulation studies.”).
47. Actual victim impact statements are difficult to come by in large numbers. In federal
cases, they are included in the presentencing report submitted to the judge, which is sealed to
the public. While statements read at trial may be studied if one can obtain a transcript of the
sentencing proceedings, the costs associated with such an undertaking are often preventative.
See Jean M. Callihan, Victim Impact Statements in Capital Trials: A Selected Bibliography,
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II. THE VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT AS A NARRATIVE OF SUFFERING
This part will develop a descriptive model for how victim impact statements
convey individual harm to an institutional audience, drawing upon the victim
statements made during the sentencing of Zayad Al Safarini. On September 5,
1986, Pan American Flight 73, on a layover from Bombay, India to Frankfurt,
Germany, was hijacked on a runway in Karachi, Pakistan by four representatives of
the Abu Nidal Organization.49 During the seventeen hours they held the plane, the
hijackers killed at least 20 of the 360 passengers, and maimed many others, after
opening fire into the cabin and lobbing grenades at the passengers.50 All of the
hijackers, including their leader, Zayad Al Safarini, were arrested and tried in
Pakistan where they were sentenced to death (sentences that were subsequently
commuted to life in prison).51 On September 28, 2001, Safarini was captured in
Bangkok after being released by Pakistan over the objections of the United States
and eventually sentenced in a U.S. district court on May 13, 2004, to a 160-year
prison term.52 The court had ruled that the Federal Death Penalty Act could not be
applied retroactively.53
Safarani’s sentencing is both uniquely useful and uniquely problematic as a
source of victim statements. Because the attack created so many victims, it
produced a very large number of statements for analysis. However, the sheer
cultural notoriety of the attack—and the fact that Safarini’s trial took place in the
years immediately following the subsequent attacks of September 11, 2001—
necessarily exaggerate the relationship between cultural memory and the ways in
which victim narratives can be structured and received. Nonetheless, the examples
of statements given by Flight 73 victims demonstrate how victim impact statements
function to allow a more multidimensional rendition of legal truth in the context of
criminal sentencing, and also the extent to which the content of victim impact
testimony can be shaped by the fact of its procedural nature—as testimony in a trial
setting.

88 CORNELL L. REV. 569, 569 (2003) (noting the paucity of reported empirical studies of
victim impact statements).
48. My analysis in this article will not distinguish between sentencing hearings decided
by judges versus those decided by juries. In the classic study of the jury, of course, Kalven
and Zeisel demonstrated that juries and judges decide verdicts the same way 75–80% of the
time. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55–57 (1966). The
distinction between judge and jury in the sentencing context—and particularly in the context
of victim impact statements where questions of empathy and narrative play such a key role—
deserves more attention than the scope of this article affords. Yet given the acknowledged
role of narrative even in judicial decisions, and my primary interest in the manner in which
victims themselves express harm, my observations are relevant to both contexts.
49. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Jordanian Hijacker Sentenced to 160 Years in
Prison for Deadly 1986 Hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 as Victims from Around the World
Recount
Horrors
(May
13,
2004),
available
at
http://www2.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel04/051304hijacker.htm.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Safarini, 257 F. Supp. 2d 191, 202–203 (D.D.C. 2003).
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In the first section of this part, I will survey the role of narrative in the legal
context generally, and the functional uniqueness of the victim impact narrative in
the trial setting. Second, I will discuss the relationship between suffering and
expression, discussing the narrative strategies through which victim impact
statements are able to overcome what theorists of pain have identified as a problem
of articulation.54 Through the application of cultural scholarship on pain and
emotion to the concrete example of the Safarini sentencing, I hope to demonstrate
how victim impact statements narrate the sheer complexity of criminal harm in a
way that would be impossible without the victim’s “voice,” and the ways in which
they translate the mechanics of this harm to a third-party listener. Third, I will
discuss the impact of the trial setting itself on the content of victim narrative. I will
argue that the victims’ own tendencies toward self-objectification, while ostensibly
justifying some critics’ concerns about “victim speak,” have the tendency to
convey the broader social ramifications of harm as the object of collective redress.
A. Law and Narrative: An Overview
Most obviously, the victim impact statement serves an explicit narrative
function: the introduction of a victim’s subjective account of her experience of
harm flowing from the defendant’s crime.55 The last several decades have seen an
increased appreciation for the central role of narrative formation throughout the
legal process generally, emphasizing the effects of storytelling—with its
incorporation of moral dichotomies, cultural mythologies, heroes, villains, and
metaphor—on legal outcomes.56 Pennington and Hastie famously found that juries,

54. See, e.g., ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN (1985).
55. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826 (1991) (noting the testimony in question
“illustrated quite poignantly some of the harm that Payne’s killing had caused”).
56. See, e.g., GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 202
(2000) (“Rather than denoting similarities between law and narrative, the Law as Narrative
trope calls upon the reader to assimilate them despite their presumed differences, to make an
imaginative leap, to participate in a fiction.” (emphasis in original)); BERNARD S. JACKSON,
LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 3 (1988) (arguing that legal rules are “sociallyconstructed narratives, accompanied by particular (and increasingly institutionalised) forms
of approval or disapproval” where “‘law’ and ‘fact’ are reduced to the same level—of
narrative structures, and the process of ‘application’ becomes one of comparison”); JAMES
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 169
(1985) (“The story is the most basic way we have of organizing our experience and claiming
meaning for it.”); Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 30, at 14, 17 (“The study of the
modalities of narrative presentation—use of points of view, verb tenses, flashbacks, and the
like—induces a sense of the uneasy relations of telling and told, an awareness of how
narrative discourse is never innocent, but always presentational, a way of working on story
events that is also a way of working on the listener or reader.”); Steven L. Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989) (explaining that narrative parallels how “the human mind makes
sense of experience”); see also PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION 45–47 (1990) (arguing that human civilizations seek to
protect themselves from the terrors of the unknown through “plausibility structures”—
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deciding upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant, make these decisions by
selecting the more appealing of the two narratives placed before them by the
prosecution and the defense, rather than simply deciding whether the prosecution
has in fact established individual elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.57
Likewise judicial opinions have been observed to incorporate background cultural
narratives into the legal rules they announce.58
As Susan Bandes notes, however, subjective narratives cannot enter the legal
context until they “pass through yet another filter, this one constructed by the law,
and consisting of specific legal rules that govern our ability to understand,
structure, and talk about experience.”59 The Federal Rules of Evidence determine
the relevance of particular stories to the case at hand and whether their emotional
content is excessively prejudicial to the defendant.60 In delivering instructions to a
jury, a judge limits the range of potential stories susceptible of determination.
Beyond these overarching framing authorities, during the guilt phase of a criminal
trial the attorneys exert a second valence of control over the subjective narratives of
the participants, ordering the presentation of information through their chosen lines
of questioning. In general, then, lawyers, rather than witnesses or even victims,
author the master narratives to which jurors respond in determining guilt.
A brief excerpt from the testimony of Clifford Cagle, victim of the Oklahoma
City bombing, is illustrative:
Q. Were you working on the day of the bombing?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Could you describe for us what you recall about that experience?
A. What I remember is I was working at my desk; and the next thing I
knew, I woke up on the floor soaking in blood; and I rolled over to let it
run out, and I heard someone call my name. And I just wiggled my
fingers so they knew who I was. And then I felt them come in and put
the stretcher under me and carry me downstairs.
Q. So you were conscious as you were carried out of the building?
A. No, I was in and out of consciousness the whole time.
human-created narratives that serve to locate the individual within the context of his social
institutions in a manner that is self-justifying).
57. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Jury Decision Making, in
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 218 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993); see also Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401
(1986) (drawing upon Pennington and Hastie in arguing for the relative plausibility theory of
proof, which posits that liability in a civil matter flows deductively from the formal structure
of law, but only after the most plausible account of the relevant events is determined).
58. See JACKSON, supra note 56, at 104 (explaining apparently contradictory outcomes
in three fraudulent representations cases as related to the identities of the plaintiffs); see also
Erin Sheley, The “Constable’s Blunder” and Other Stories: Narrative Representations of the
Police and the Criminal in the Development of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule,
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 121; Jonathan Yovel, Running Backs, Wolves, and Other Fatalities:
How Manipulations of Narrative Coherence in Legal Opinions Marginalize Violent Death,
16 LAW & LITERATURE 127, 144 (2004) (arguing that “[i]t is through the narrative framing
and structuring of the ‘facts’ of a case that normativity is introduced and woven with
facticity, even when morphologically this appears otherwise”).
59. Bandes, supra note 3, at 384.
60. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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Q. When you got outside the building, where were you taken on the
stretcher?
A. Out to the plaza, I think; and somebody asked me what hospital. I
said VA, and they said no.61
In this exchange, the victim moves rapidly through the moment of actual violence,
of which we get only that he rolled over and was conscious of his own blood. The
narrative developed by the prosecutor—which will continue on to the hospital, the
nature of the victim’s injuries, the medical care over the years necessary to repair
them, and other more measurable material facts62—never returns to the lived
experience of the trauma itself.
A unique characteristic of victim impact statements, amongst the various other
narratives implicated in a criminal trial, is the increased degree of narrative
authority they cede to the victim—subject to the oversight of the judge and the
objections of opposing counsel, yet released from the regulative authority of
questioning attorneys that govern the majority of the proceedings. Payne held that
victim impact evidence may not be so “unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair” under the Fourteenth Amendment,63 but few states impose
formal procedural limitations on victim impact statements. In Oklahoma, Georgia,
and Tennessee the prosecution must notify the defendant of its intent to introduce
impact evidence and the court must hold an in-camera hearing to determine its
admissibility.64 (In Oklahoma, “the trial court may wish to consider whether a
question-and-answer format may be a preferable method of controlling the way
relevant victim impact evidence is presented to a jury.”65) Similarly, Maryland
requires that all victim impact evidence be incorporated in a presentencing report to
be considered by the judge or jury.66 New Jersey requires that defendants be
notified of the prosecution’s intention to use impact evidence and allows testimony
from only one family member, on the basis of a written statement that is reviewed
in advance by the court for prejudicial content.67 In most jurisdictions, however, the
prosecution can present victim impact information in any way it chooses, which
generally allows victims to deliver free-form narratives, or submit them by writing
to the court.68 The narrative freedom of the victim impact statement has, as we will
see, implications for the manner in which suffering is articulated in these
statements, and also for the subject-object relationship between the victim and
defendant and between each of them and the legal system itself.

61. Transcript of Trial Examination of Gregory Sohn, Michael Lenz, Cynthia Ashwood,
Kay Ice, Melissa Webster, Peggy Broxterman, Robbie Maroney, Jeannine Gist, Clifford
Cagle, Sharon McCullough, Debbie Pippin & Gary Campbell at 35–36, United States v.
McVeigh, 955 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Colo. 1997) (No. 96-CR-68).
62. Id. at 36–37.
63. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
64. See Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748, 752 (Ga. 1994); State v. Nesbit, 978
S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
65. Cargle, 909 P.2d at 828.
66. MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERVS. § 6-112 (West 1998).
67. State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996).
68. For a survey of the formats in which victim impact testimony has been allowed, see
Logan, supra note 7, at 153–154.
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B. The Narrative Structure of Pain
In this section I will briefly survey the scholarship on the relationship between
suffering and narrative and its implications for testimony, emphasizing the
relationship between pain, expression, and the external world, all of which bear
upon the function and appropriateness of pain narratives in the public context of the
criminal trial.
1. Pain and the Problem of Inarticulability
Crucial to any debate over victim impact statements is the nature of the harm
rendered by a criminal act and the question of whether victim testimony is an
appropriate means of conveying that harm to a fact finder deciding upon a
punishment when weighed against competing concerns regarding prejudice to the
defendant. Before we can consider the impact of the victim’s voice on the
institutional structure in which she speaks and the defendant upon whom that
structure operates, we must determine its relationship to the victim’s actual
suffering. This presents a threshold analytical dilemma. Like all texts, a victim
impact statement is necessarily removed from the objects it describes. In the
context of criminal violence this problem may be exacerbated by the very internal,
isolating nature of pain that, as Dr. Johnson tells us,69 and as contemporary cultural
theorists have often noted, complicates its verbal expression.70 If the victim impact

69. See Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS OF DR. JOHNSON 69 (George
Birkbeck Hill ed., 1889) (“[T]hose who do not feel pain, seldom think that it is felt.”).
70. A threshold question in theorizing the verbal expression of pain is, of course,
whether one means “pain” as the experience of physical or emotional trauma. In The Body in
Pain, Elaine Scarry explicitly separates the two, emphasizing the uniqueness of “physical”
pain in its lack of association with an external object. See SCARRY, supra note 54, at 165.
Unlike, for example, the more quintessentially “emotional” capacity to feel sadness about
something or fear of something external, Scarry argues for the uniquely internal property of
physical pain, and that “the more a habitual form of perception is experienced as itself rather
than its external object, the closer it lies to pain.” Id. This distinction between physical and
mental suffering has been criticized in the psychological literature. Indeed, the history of
conceptualizing pain has a close parallel in the history of thinking about emotion more
broadly. In the materialist model associated with Descartes, emotions are sensations caused
by objects, or, for Hume, “impressions” made by the outside world. RENÉ DESCARTES, THE
PASSIONS OF THE SOUL 7–8 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2010), available at
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/descpass.pdf; DAVID HUME, 1 A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 316–17 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1898). By contrast, in a “cognitive” model
inaugurated by Aristotle, emotions flow from mental attitudes or judgments. See generally
ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC (Hugh Lawson-Tancred ed., 1991). Recent scholarship by
neurologist Antonio Damasio and others suggests that rationality is in fact guided by
emotional input. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON,
AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994). In The Culture of Pain, David Morris traces a similar
dichotomy in historical understandings of what we normally term “physical” pain. He argues
that nineteenth-century science, and in particular the work of Bell, Magendie, Muller,
Weber, Von Frey, and Shiff, developed a purely mechanistic view of pain as “no more than
an electrical impulse speeding along the nerves.” DAVID B. MORRIS, THE CULTURE OF PAIN 4

2012]

REVERBERATIONS OF THE VICTIM’S “VOICE”

1261

statement is a flawed means of expressing the harm we seek to punish, it becomes
all the more vulnerable to criticisms that it serves only to convey legally irrelevant
information and prejudicial feelings of anger and disgust toward the defendant.
In one of the first major works on the nature of physical pain, Elaine Scarry
identifies what she deems to be its essential inexpressibility. She argues that it is
destructive of language and, thus, articulation: “[W]hen one hears about another
person’s physical pain, the events happening within the interior of that person’s
body may seem to have the remote character of some deep subterranean fact,
belonging to an invisible geography that . . . has no reality.”71 Her discussion on
torture suggests how such language destruction plays out in the context of criminal
violence: for the victim of torture the fact of his agony will render the questions he
is asked or the world to which they refer insignificant; the nonverbal screams of
physical suffering are only one symptom of the undoing of articulate meaning in
the face of pain. Like the tortured prisoner, the victim of criminal violence—at the
moment of its infliction—is related to her assailant through an economy of pain and
meaning: “the absence of pain is a presence of world; the presence of pain is the
absence of world” and “[a]cross this set of inversions pain becomes power.”72 In
other words, the author of a violent crime derives his power from the ability to
collapse a victim’s reality into the single fact of his agency. A victim impact
statement may be read as an attempt at world re-creation. Frequently described as
“empowering,”73 the victim impact statement can be understood structurally as, at
one level, a reversal of this agent-object relationship. In imposing verbal meaning
on the set of events that has turned the assailant into the object—as the defendant in

(1991). Morris himself urges that biochemistry is “inextricably bound up with the personal
and cultural meanings that we carve out of pain,” citing the work of contemporary pain
clinics in identifying psychogenic pain and a variety of other cultural sources as evidence
against a purely bodily conception of pain. Id. at 5.
In considering the various types of suffering that can be narrated in a victim impact
statement—from the wounds to flesh rendered by an explosion to the emotional wounds
inflicted on the parent of someone killed in the same blast—it is important to remember that
the slippery relationship between mind and body that has complicated understanding of both
pain and emotion over time necessarily orients the two in relation to one another. The
experience of pain to the body is shaped by the emotions that accompany it and the social
conditions that help produce them, and physical pain generates emotions of its own. While
Scarry is certainly correct that instances of extreme physical suffering can approach the
obliteration of externality—can create a world for the sufferer in which the only emotion is
bodily pain—for the purposes of discussing victim narratives in the social context of a
trial—necessarily separated by time from the immediate sensations of even the most
consuming physical pain—it is not helpful to speak of “physical” and “emotional” as distinct
categories. Both categories may be subsumed into the broader category of “suffering,” or
even the clinical category of “trauma,” which, in the context of criminal punishment, must
then be measured as harm done to the victim for the purposes of determining and punishing
the defendant’s fault.
71. SCARRY, supra note 54, at 3; see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601, 1603 (1986) (agreeing with Scarry’s destructive rendition of pain and noting
that “[w]henever the normative world of a community survives fear, pain, and death in their
more extreme forms, that very survival is understood to be literally miraculous”).
72. SCARRY, supra note 54, at 37.
73. See, e.g., Erez, supra note 2.
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a criminal trial with its inherent threats to his own bodily agency—the victim’s
narrated “presence of world” acts to collapse her assailant’s. It must do so,
however, through a temporal removal and through the structures of the legal
system, with their inherent limits on agency.
These removals contribute to Scarry’s problem of inarticulability. She describes
a tort case involving pain and suffering, for an example, as a situation requiring that
the “impediments to expressing pain be overcome,” and that “built into the very
structure of the case is a dispute about the correspondence between language and
material reality: the accuracy of the descriptions of suffering given by the plaintiff’s
lawyer may be contested.”74 The same linguistic problems apply in the criminal
case, as illustrated by various victim witnesses during the Safarini sentencing.
One witness, recalling her earlier testimony during the defendant’s prior trial in
Karachi, says, “when I started testifying, they started glaring at me to such an
extent the judge had to stop the proceeding and ask them to stop because I was
stuttering so much I could barely speak.”75 Her language, in that case, had remained
inaccessible, still in the power of the defendant and—in a different manner—of the
court.
Later, flight attendant Madhvi Bahaguna urges the judge to “pause and
acknowledge [the] spirits that I hear,” noting, “the photographs of each and every
one of them we saw this morning, they all spoke to us. And I’m hoping and
wishing they spoke to you to convey in their own words other than the sorrow felt
by each and every one of us for their loss.”76 Bahaguna—particularly in her
recourse to the visual props of the photographs to access “spoken” suffering—
expresses the insufficiency of third-party sorrow for another being to articulate the
actual experience of physical annihilation and loss of self.
Yet witness Michael Thexton explains the difficulties of explaining the
experience of individual “terror” against an external socially shared signifier:
The word “terrorism” is used so much to describe a global news issue
that I think people forget what it means individually and in detail. To
me, I was deprived of the capacity for rational thought. I was convinced
that there was a man with a gun right behind me watching my every
move.77
For him, the threat of violence was as world destroying as the material absorption
of violence Scarry theorizes. The external context of “terrorism” had no meaning
and could not be incorporated rationally into his experience. What mattered was the
local externality of the gun, and its totality of meaning for a prisoner. It is this
individual state of mind that he struggles to convey against a background social
context to which he himself has returned. The same passenger refers to the
difficulty in expressing the pain of being forced to hold one’s hands in the air for

74. SCARRY, supra note 54, at 10.
75. Transcript of a Sentencing, May 12, 2004 at 45, United States v. Safarini, 257 F.
Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. CR-91-504) [hereinafter Safarini, Official Trial Transcript
May 12].
76. Id. at 80–81.
77. Id. at 107.
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hours on end to listeners after the fact whom he perceived as “disappointed” when
he explained that he hadn’t been beaten.78 Another witness, members of whose
family had been on the plane but who had not been herself, notes that the attack
was “not something we spoke of normally”79 and her mother testifies to the fact
that the inherent nonsharable nature of what happened put a gap between the
members of the family who had suffered it and those who had not.80 And yet
another witness opens his statement by thanking the prosecutors, the court, and the
FBI because he feared he “may not have the courage to thank you after I finish my
statement.”81 His fear suggests dual benevolent and intimidating connotations for
the system that regulates and stages his speech.
Critics of victim impact statements perhaps refer in part to such linguistic
limitations in arguing that victim statements may not in fact be “true to the victim’s
experience,” failing to allow us “to know the victim in his or her particularity” but
drawing instead on “stock ‘victim’ imagery.”82 Additional examples from the
Safarini sentencing, however, demonstrate how a victim may overcome difficulties
of expression to access pain and deliver a highly specific account of harm through
idiosyncratic temporal organization of her narrative. Indeed, the space for freeflowing narrative control afforded by the victim statement may in fact provide the
only means for certain types of harm to be conveyed in the trial setting.
One victim, a child of fourteen at the time of the incident, moves through the
events of the experience in chronological order, starting with her hyperventilation
when the hijackers stormed the plane, remembering the man sitting next to her
mother urging them not to show their fear, and noting she commenced a fifteenyear period of emotional numbness from then on.83 Yet at the moment in her
narrative at which the hijackers’ gunfire should have begun, the witness does not
discuss it explicitly, but focuses her entire attention on the loss of a set of rings the
mother and the witness made for her sister.84 Instead of the violence, she traces the
history of these objects forward in time—how she felt awful for losing them, how
she gave her sister a set of rings that had been made for herself, lying to her “as if
they were hers in the first place,” and finally, how in 2000, she told her sister the
truth and her sister returned the rings to her.85 It is only later in her statement,
during a free associative sequence, in which she reflects on her life since the event,
that we get actual testimony of her sensory experience of the violence of the attack:
I watched The Fisher King in the movie theatre. There was one scene
where the character, played by Robin Williams, is having lunch in a
restaurant with his wife. They are sitting at a table near a window when

78. Id. at 106.
79. Transcript of a Sentencing, May 13, 2004 at 14, United States v. Safarini, 257 F.
Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. CR-92-504) [hereinafter Safarini, Official Trial Transcript
May 13].
80. Id.
81. Id. at 15.
82. Bandes, supra note 3, at 405–06; see also Minow, supra note 9, at 1432.
83. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 98–99.
84. See id. at 100.
85. Id.
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someone opens fire into the restaurant and shoots her head. Her flesh is
spewed on Robin Williams’ face and glasses. It was at that very
moment I realized what had been on my seat when I put my hand down
to get up off the floor after the gunfire that stopped. It was the flesh and
blood of someone on the plane. It took five years before that connection
was made for me and I was absolutely horrified and visibly upset.86
With the victim allowed to approach the traumatic experience through a temporal
organization of her own devising, the fact finder now has access to a deeper version
of truth about the event, in this case a tactile response to the physical carnage
around her, which had otherwise been narratively supplanted by a story about
losing her sister’s rings.87
Likewise, one of the surviving flight attendants starts her narrative by speaking
of the aftereffects of the attack—how it “took years to sleep without nightmares,”
her difficulty in trusting others, and the difficulty of finding the courage to have a
baby.88 Her narrative leaps back and forth in time, from her decision to have a
baby, to her youthfulness and that of her fellow flight attendants before the
hijacking, to the scene of the terrorists’ first trial in Karachi, to the immediate
present in which she cannot watch movies with violence or handle her children
holding her around the neck.89 Only through this disordered temporality does she
finally relate her first deeply sensory memory of the attack itself, this time an aural
one: “I’ll never, ever forget the noise of 400 passengers howling. They were
howling and they were crying, ‘Oh God, oh God, oh God.’ And they were howling.
They sounded like animals. All of us did. We were so scared.”90 She then remains
in the scene of the hijacking to discuss the deaths of certain specific hostages before
abruptly leaping ahead again to a specific unrealized future scene, about the
planned birthday party of one of the murdered flight attendants: “Neerja had the
rest of her life ahead of her. We were all going. We had all carried food and snacks
and alcohol to have a party in Frankfurt to celebrate her birthday. . . . She never got
to have children.”91
Not only does the victim’s nonchronological organization allow her to translate
the aural experience of the attack for the sentencing authority, but it also lets her
convey the damage of the crime on simultaneous temporal lines. We can
experience the unexperienced birthday party for Neerja simultaneous to the reality
of her death without children, again simultaneous to the victim’s own tortuous path
toward motherhood. This complex interconnection of immediate experience with
altered histories reflects the reality of the complexity of the violence itself.

86. Id. at 102–03.
87. The tendency toward narrative disorder in victim statements may actually have
quantitative implications that could weaken concerns that the harm they convey is arbitrary
or unrelated to the actual harm of the offense. In the field of psychology, attachment theory
measures the coherence of narratives given by adult subjects during interviews to measure
emotional disorder. See ADULT ATTACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL
IMPLICATIONS (W. Steven Rholes & Jeffry A. Simpson eds., 2006).
88. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 44–45.
89. Id. at 45–46.
90. Id. at 46.
91. Id. at 48.
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Witness Prabhat Krishnaswamy’s short chronology of the remaining unlived life
of his dead father follows a more orderly trajectory to similar effect:
What might have been would include a father’s pride at the
commencement ceremonies at two doctoral degrees awarded to his
children. What might have been is his majestic presence as his children
got married. What might have been is the simple and sublime joy on his
face at the sight of his beautiful grandchildren, none of whom he ever
saw. What might have been is the sweetness of companionship for my
mother in her advancing years. What might have been is an opportunity
to perpetuate the values and culture he so dearly held to another
generation in the family.92
It is important to note, however, that this list of counterfactuals contains an
embedded factual history of the victim’s family, one of upper-middle-class
professional and domestic accomplishment, which is suggested to have unfolded as
described in the absence of the patriarch. This sort of narrative, with its suffering
linked to claims of prestige and breeding, is a type of the “privileged” accounts of
which Bandes and other critics of victim impact statements are suspicious. Yet to
the extent that professional accomplishment and traditional values in their own
right elicit irrelevant sympathy on the part of the fact finder, they form the
particularized surface disrupted by the defendant’s harm. This pain—especially as
felt over time and increasingly removed from its initial absorption—is inextricable
from the social and cultural context of this family, which clearly prides education
and the stewardship of a father as a repository of culture.
The temporal control ceded to the victim in the context of his statement can,
however, expand even into the past to organize storytelling around facts that
preceded the defendant’s acts entirely. Witness Tushar Nagar, whose sister Trupti
had died in the attack, notes that his own story is “parallel to her son’s,”
introducing details about the death of their mother when he was ten years old and
the remarriage of their father to “a typical stepmother, who, in the typical sense,
was and is not a very nice person,” noting that Trupti, “being the younger one than
me, and the girl, had suffered a lot through her hands.”93 By fitting his sister’s story
into a kind of Cinderella narrative—the deserved happy ending usurped by a return
to the maternal loss at the beginning—the witness is able to marshal pre-existing
cultural narratives into the service of his own personal story of loss. This use of
time frames, however, clearly expands the testimony beyond the limits of the harm
attributable to Safarini. (He reinforces the narrative impact of the subverted fairy
tale when he later mentions the fact that he had also missed Trupti’s wedding in
1973 because he was a student at the time and could not afford the trip; again he
creates a parallel between pre-incident and post-incident hurt—he missed the happy
ending of a wedding back in 1973 and likewise missed his sister on the tragic 1986
trip, when he would have seen her for the first time in five years.94) The harms are

92. Id. at 53.
93. Id. at 64.
94. Id. at 65.
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clearly distinct—and only one attributable to the attack—yet they reinforce each
other and doubtless shape Nagar’s own understanding of his suffering.
While these examples show how the challenges to articulating harm may be
circumvented through narrative freedom, to the extent that they remain one might
ask whether the problem of inarticulability should dull the concerns of the
statements’ opponents that they will result in excessively high sentences. But
perhaps these concerns could be restated. If the “harm-as-expressed” in an
emotional victim statement is in fact distinct from “harm-as-experienced,” does that
illegitimate it as a factor in punishment? Does expressed harm, in other words,
convey only animus toward the defendant, or positive yet irrelevant qualities about
the victim in the moment of testimony, instead of the actual harm experienced by
the victim at the defendant’s hands? To answer these questions we must consider
the models of narrated suffering that account for its relationship to a listener.
2. Suffering in Relation to the Social World
Critics of Scarry’s emphasis on the internality of pain have focused on the
nonmaterial effects of its annunciation. Veena Das describes the communicability
of material pain as “an articulation of the world in which the strangeness of the
world revealed by death, by its non-inhabitability, can be transformed into a world
in which one can dwell again.”95 Sara Ahmed argues that the very solitariness of
pain is tied up with its implication in relation to others, but pain, like other
emotions, possesses an inherent sociality derived in part from its relation to
external objects.96 For Ahmed, objects—including people—are read as the cause of
emotions such as pain in the very process of an individual’s taking orientation
towards them.97 Yet because objects themselves circulate through society,
orientations toward them are formed socially, not only internally.98 In the context of
criminal violence, the qualities of a trial that are inherently objectifying toward the
defendant render the victim’s pain socially shared. While recognizing that
confrontation of another’s pain entails a certain degree of what she terms
“aboutness” (the sufferer’s remaining the object of our feeling rather than a cosufferer), she concludes that the sociality of pain carries an ethical demand that “I
must act that which I cannot know, rather than act insofar as I know.”99 A listener
to a pain narrative cannot simply hide on the other side of the chasm of ignorance,
Scarry theorizes: instead the incomprehensibility of one’s own potential for pain
must serve as a point of access for the incomprehensibility of someone else’s. In
the case of violent acts against an individual, as Ahmed puts it, the body of the
community has been damaged.100 The danger, for her, becomes “the fetishisation
the wound” as a commodity, securing the narrative of injury to the more privileged

95. Veena Das, Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain, in
SOCIAL SUFFERING 67, 68 (Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das & Margaret Lock eds., 1997).
96. SARA AHMED, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EMOTION 5–7 (2004).
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 31.
100. Id. at 33.
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members of a community.101 In the political use of the “victim voice” to justify a
particular political agenda, as observed by Simon and other critics,102 we may see a
kind of fetishization at work. But to critique this cultural practice does not justify a
categorical exclusion of the true claims of an individual victim narrative to the
extent that they are susceptible of translation to a jury.
Many of the victim statements during the Safarini sentencing demonstrate the
capacity to generate material symbols to convey broader spatial and temporal
effects through the experience of an individual. Krishnaswamy, for example,
opened his statement about the death of his father with the fact that
[t]here is still a small suitcase that sits in the corner of my basement just
like any other that is carried on board an airplane and fits neatly under
the seat. It was bright green and brand new 17 years ago when it was
first used for the only time. It is rarely opened because of the flood of
memories associated with it.103
In a single object, with its particular temporal history and physical space, a
listener may simultaneously, and intuitively, apprehend a number of individual and
collective truths about the violence. Most simplistically, the suitcase—riddled, as
he goes on to say, with shrapnel—symbolizes the death of his father.
Yet the language he chooses expands its significance. “It fits neatly under the
seat,” we are told—after the testimony of numerous other victims revealed the
efforts of the parents on board the plane to force their children under the seats
during the assault. This space of violence and fear can now be accessed through the
suitcase itself. Yet the suitcase is still in the corner of the son’s basement; his
father’s murder and the horrors of the space under the seat now exist in the physical
present. A listener can experience more directly the presence of this pain—this
constantly threatening “flood of memories”—for the grown son in the present. In
the suitcase’s lack of use for seventeen years we may apprehend a stagnant fear of
travel, which points the listener less to the individual family (who we have no
reason to believe have not themselves traveled for those seventeen years) but to the
shared social reality altered by the attack: a pervasive fear of air travel in the late
‘80s which culminated itself in Pan Am going bankrupt.104 This power of an
individually significant object to serve as an access point to so many concentric
realities would be lost in the traditional questioning of a witness, in which the
attorney-as-narrator would be unlikely to think the contents of the victim’s
basement relevant to the overall story being established.
A male victim, who was on Flight 73 with his wife, who was murdered,
indicated at the outset that the couple had believed her to be pregnant. He goes on:
After the hours in the plane, after they had tossed all their hand
grenades and fired all the bullets, I saw my wife’s beautiful tranquil

101. Id.
102. SIMON, supra note 8, at 105–106.
103. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 49–50.
104. Dan Reed, Pan Am About to Make Its Final Exit: It’s Taken 15 Years to Tie Up
Defunct Airline’s Loose Ends, USA TODAY, Oct. 31, 2006, at 1B.
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face. I tried to wake her up. She looked as if she was asleep. I pulled
her towards me, only to recoil in horror. She was missing the entire
right side of her body from the neck up. I saw a gaping hole, a skull.
Each and every day I wake up to that horrendous site [sic] of my wife’s
skull etched into my memory. Like that picture, a serene face on one
half and the scarred skeleton on the other, my life is divided.105
In this one image, the victim has conflated the conjugal space of the bedroom—
in which his wife had become pregnant and in which she now seemed merely to be
sleeping—with the space of carnage on the plane, in which his wife has become an
object of terror—a mere “skull” or “skeleton.” This simultaneity of past and present
in one object, like that effected by the green suitcase in the basement, allows a
listener to experience the distorting effects of violence along its entire temporal
axis. The tendency of a traumatic event like a wife’s murder to escape articulation
seems reflected by the victim’s dichotomy between “serene face” and “scarred
skeleton,” but in this case the simultaneous narrative experience of his wife alive
and dead provides a more thorough account of the defendant’s actions against the
past, present, and future of these individuals. These examples demonstrate how the
free format of a victim impact statement and the space it allows for idiosyncratic
use of external symbol overcome the internal constraints of expressing suffering.
Many of these narratives seem to reach for the external objects that Scarry argues
pain seeks to assist in signification, yet they do so in a manner that is temporally
complex, using the visual surface of these objects as a point of access for the
listener and overlaying them with multiple iterations of harm experienced over
time.
It is clear, however, that even the sometimes-idiosyncratic objects selected by
particular victims to accomplish this import other valences of cultural meaning.
Ahmed’s argument about the relationship between emotion and objects is helpful in
considering the effects of these narratives in the fact-finding context. She argues
that feelings—even presumptively shared feelings (here, for example, a courtroom
horrified at evidence of a bloody crime) are always in tension, as no two parties
share the same relationship to the feeling. (The contrast between the positions of
judge and victim, in this case, could not make this clearer.) Emotion circulates,
then, through the objects of emotion, which become “sticky, or saturated with
affect, as sites of personal and social tension.”106 Attachment, Ahmed argues, takes
place through being moved by the proximity of others, sometimes by fixing others
as having certain characteristics.
Indeed, many of Safarini’s victims focused on the varying degrees of their
material “woundedness,” conceived of differently by all of them but establishing
them collectively as sites of emotion over the wounding of society in general.107

105. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 73.
106. AHMED, supra note 96, at 11.
107. The purely material body of the victim is, of course, center stage in a criminal
proceeding, and several of the statements express rhetorical resistance to this embodiment.
Anesh Bhanot, brother of murdered flight attendant Neerja Bhanot, states that Safarini
“killed Neerja’s body, but he may not be so happy to know that her spirit is still alive.”
Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 62–63. Witness Michael
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But their wounds were not the only objects recurred to throughout the testimony;
most strikingly, the example of the green suitcase had the potential to translate
numerous levels of individual and collective harm to listeners whose own approach
to it was filtered by the events of September 11, 2001. Whether this could be read
as an unfair importation of irrelevant information into the process or merely an
effective means of overcoming the internality of pain through recourse to socially
circulating emotion is open for debate.
In his cultural history of pain, David Morris, like Ahmed, recognizes that pain is
deeply social, “constructed or shaped by the culture from which we now feel
excluded or cut off.”108 He uses the Tolstoy story The Death of Ivan Ilych—
involving the inexplicable and agonizing illness and death of a middle class
bureaucrat who, at the end, embraces death as a form of spiritual awakening—to
demonstrate how “pain inescapably absorbs the scent and feel of its social life.”109
In Morris’ reading, Ilych’s physical agony reflected his struggle to retain a belief in
the value of his “secular, self-centered, commonplace, bourgeois existence,” which
was finally sublimated into a spiritual tranquility contingent upon the nineteenthcentury utopian Christian social viewpoint from which Tolstoy was writing.110
Morris traces the idea of pain as an experience in search of meaning throughout
history. From the ecstasies of the Catholic martyrs, to the Enlightenment
materialism of the Marquis de Sade, to the reports of Holocaust victims who
attributed their survival to successful attempts to find meaning in their suffering,
pain is shaped—and alleviated—through engagement with external context. In the
case of a criminal trial, the external context implicates the legal system as a more or

Thexton, who was for some period of time held at the front of the plane as the intended
second passenger to be executed testifies that Safarini threatened the officials on the ground
that “If anyone comes near the plane . . . we will kill one body immediately” and notes
“[o]ne body, that’s what I was.” Id. at 110. Nine of the twenty two victims use explicit
variations on the theme of emotional suffering expressed in the language of material injury,
some linking this injury to the injury of society at large. For example, Anesh Bhanot
describes Safarini as “a person who with a scar on the face of mankind is now facing just
retribution.” Id. at 63. Antusa Dasgupta says her entire family was “scarred for life” after
living through the attack. Id. at 134. Farhat Hussain, who suffered from lifelong chronic back
pain as a result of the attack, recurs to the falseness of the mind/body duality noted in much
of the literature on pain in describing her difficulties in getting others to understand the
nature of her suffering:
This is the human nature to understand only the physical disabilities and feel
compassionate towards you or be helpful to you. But we have scars on our
hearts and minds and our brains. They are engraved. Each and every word in
our statements and the words that we heard from yesterday morning are
engraved in our brains and they will never be taken out.
Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 13, at 36–37. Yet Dasgupta’s account indicates a role
for testimonial expression that differs from both the Scarry model of inarticuability and the
social models of Ahmed and others. For Dasgupta, the words themselves—far from failing
in their capacities as signifiers—are the pain; the experience as transfigured into words has
placed scars directly onto the body, yet on the inside, where they can only be felt, rather than
expressed.
108. MORRIS, supra note 70, at 38.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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less successful vehicle of justice and the very economies of world destruction
identified by Scarry in her internal model.
Writing in the context of personal injury litigation and utilizing semiotic
analysis, Jody Madeira has developed a model for pain as a dual construct in which
“pain expressed” serves as a signifier for the signified of “pain embodied.”111 She
explains the implications of this formulation with recourse to the work of Charles
Peirce, who theorized the system formed by signifier and signified as a sign
standing in relation to an “interpretant,” or the (distinct) sign created in the mind of
a second party.112 She isolates three relationships between sign and interpretant that
get to the heart of the interpersonal dynamics of pain testimony in law:
An interpretant can be emotional, “a feeling,” as in the thrill of an
empathic connection that we form with a sufferer; it can be energetic,
involving effort, as in attempts to comprehend the significance of an
expression of pain; or it can be logical in the sense of invoking future
implications, as in gauging how the long-term consequences of an
injury may affect an award of damages.113
The various trajectories along which pain as a sign-system interacts with external
auditors demonstrate the interpersonal capabilities of pain and the social potential
of enunciation. As Madeira notes in the personal injury context, “[e]xpressions of
pain attain the height of desirability in a legal sense when the meaning of the pain
whose tale they tell is particularly upsetting—that is, when it is most culturally
undesirable.”114 Yet, as do all sign systems, this model involves construction of the
underlying signified; the process of communication necessarily shapes that which
is communicated.
Madeira describes a two-part process of construction, in which the existence of
pain embodied (that which is experienced in Scarry’s dark chasm during the
harmful incident) must be established through pain expressed (the testimony of the
plaintiff) and then to be accessed/empathized with by a listening juror. Because the

111. Jody Lynee Madeira, Recognizing Odysseus’ Scar: Reconceptualizing Pain and Its
Empathic Role in Civil Adjudication, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41 (2006). Semiotic theory
studies how ideas are represented and transmitted socially, and takes as its basic premise that
a “sign,” as a unit of meaning, consists of “everything that, on the grounds of a previously
established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something else.”
UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 16 (1976) (emphasis omitted). In this system a
“sign” is the relationship of a “signifier” sitting over a “signified.” The signifier is visible or
otherwise ascertainably present (a picture of a tree, for example), and the signified is absent
but invoked by reference (an actual tree). See generally ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF
SEMIOLOGY (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 1967).
112. Madeira also applies the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein on the public meaning of
“private” sensations such as pain, once expressed. Madeira, supra note 111, at 64–67. She
concludes that “each instantiation of pain is public: pain embodied in that it is understood
and made meaningfully in public and not private space, and pain expressed in that it is a
manifestly public acknowledgement of a sensation predetermined to be publicly
meaningful.” Id. at 70.
113. Id. at 61–62 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 73.
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purpose of a criminal trial is to vindicate society for a criminal wrong inflicted
through the specific occasion of harm to an individual, Madeira’s account of how
the tort system captures suffering for the purposes of compensating a victim is
equally relevant to our consideration of the criminal context. (I will discuss the
precise relationship between individual harm and the societal experience of
criminal harm at greater length in Part III.) For Madeira, “[t]he focus on the
plaintiff’s body now widens to encompass not only a body in pain but a person,
including not only the interpretation of the physical symptoms of pain but also its
causation and consequences.”115 Therefore, “pain expressed is again tied back to
the suffering body that it afflicts so that it may be ‘cured’ through
compensation.”116 Amongst the requisite attributes of narrated pain that Madeira
deems likely to achieve this return include: 1) the enunciation of a “sentimentalized
body” that a juror will desire to “cure,” 2) the moral authority of the expressed pain
(derived from the perceived truthfulness of the representation relative to the actual
suffering), and 3) the trajectory of its interpretive consequences in terms of the
legal precedents created through a particular verdict.117 Madeira concludes with the
claim that “the least we can do for the sufferer is to see her pain not as an
unascertainable condition locked away from our understanding in her physical
body but as a condition that we can publicly recognize, probe, and perhaps cure.”118
Madeira’s use of the medical language of “probing” and “curing,” however, points
to a pervasive dynamic running throughout the legal system, particularly relevant in
the criminal context, which any model for understanding the transmission of harm
in a victim statement must incorporate: the victim’s relationship to the institutional
authority of the system that facilitates her “voice.”
The examples from the Safarini sentencing collected in note 105 demonstrate
how one attribute of successfully narrated pain which Madeira identifies in the
personal injury context is at work in the criminal. The constant recurrence to the
language of physical injury to self—even when expressed to convey “emotional”
suffering—repeatedly brought the focus of the proceedings back to the site of the
victim’s body. Unlike a tort context in which the potential “cure” the listener may
grant is simply a payout for the plaintiff, however, here the potential cures sought
by the various witnesses varied dramatically, from the legally impossible sentence
of death,119 to solitary confinement,120 to more benign prison conditions, as Gargi
Dave and Michael Thexton urge.121 Indeed, the sheer diversity of sentences

115. Id. at 74.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 79.
118. Id. at 96.
119. See, e.g., Testimony of Prabhat Krishnaswamy, Safarini, Official Trial Transcript
May 12, supra note 75, at 55–56 (“What would the victims like to do about it? The victims
would like to charge the defendant, tear him into pieces, one limb at a time, and feed his
remains as a feast for hyenas and vultures. But in spite of that pain and anger, the victims do
subscribe to the dignity of law . . . . He deserves three forms of death penalty, not three
consecutive life sentences.”).
120. Testimony of Tushar Nagar, id. at 70 (“I would request you to at least recommend,
you know . . . [t]hat he would never see daylight again.”).
121. Testimony of Gargi Dave, id. at 90 (“I’m not saying that I don’t want a hard
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proposed by victims for even a crime as dramatic as this act of terrorism undercuts
the assumptions made by critics of victim impact statements that “question[s]
whether there is room for complex, compassionate, and politically liberal narratives
. . . in the Payne lexicon.”122
Even Dave, however, links her request for mercy to the image of her own, nowhealthy body; through the “healing” she describes she has metamorphosed from the
broken child body in a coma to a new whole body.123 Yet in many other of these
statements we have seen how the victim’s ability to control the temporal
organization of her narrative allows her to transcend the symbolism of her own
material body and articulate the unique experience of intangible suffering over
time, to articulate what Madeira would call the “causation and consequences” of
the material harm suffered.
C. The Victim in Her Object-Relationship to the Court
The state, by way of its legal procedures, sits over the embodied victim, exerting
agency and objectifying her through scrutiny and analysis as the defendant
objectified her materially. In her concurrence in Payne, Justice O’Connor
unintentionally reveals this dynamic, declaring that “[murder] transforms a living
person with hopes, dreams and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is
special and unique about the person” and that “[t]he Constitution does not preclude
a State from deciding to give some of that back.”124 In O’Connor’s rendition, the
victim—now a corpse by the defendant’s hand—may be reanimated if the state
“decides” she may; this reanimation may only occur in the form of testimony in a
forum the state may choose to “give.” It is not only the defendant that becomes, in
Ahmed’s formulation, an object-moving-in society for the purposes of translating
pain, but the victim, whose suffering has a communicative purpose in the judicial
system outside of her own intention. The “interpretive consequences” Madeira
identifies as the third factor in well-narrated pain are even more important in the
criminal context: a criminal jury does not consider harm to a victim in isolation for
the purposes of remunerating her, but as a particular case of a general harm to
punishment, but I don’t believe in people treating people inhumanely. I don’t. I don’t know
what solitary confinement is like, but I can imagine. And no matter how vile a person is, I
just don’t believe in treating people inhumanely.”); Testimony of Michael Thexton, id. at
116–19 (“I suppose I forgave him on that day and cannot now unforgive him for myself . . . .
I know that this Court will bring justice for everyone and I don’t think justice has any
business forgiving him . . . . Just for myself and one or two other people I’m glad that this is
not about the death penalty. . . . [D]on’t put him necessarily in solitary confinement, but . . .
get a tape made of some of the statements that we’ve heard today and . . . play some of those
to him every day . . . [a]nd if, when he does feel some remorse, he could go out and try and
tell somebody else who might otherwise hijack a plane . . . what a senseless, useless, evil
waste it is.”).
122. Bandes, supra note 3, at 406.
123. Testimony of Gargi Dave, Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75,
at 81–82 (“Even though it is hard to relive and to reexperience and to talk, I think it’s
healing.”); id. at 88 (“I managed to get into law school despite the problems I had. And, you
know, I plan to become an attorney. And I’m not going to let this dominate who I am. . . .
But it’s made me, in some ways, I hope, a better human being.”).
124. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 832 (1991).
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society inflicted by criminality. If the court can speak of the victim as an object to
be reanimated, it is because she—aside from the claims of her individual identity—
serves a functional purpose in the overall cultural project of criminal punishment,
with its broader goals.
This systemic objectifying tendency has been documented in a number of varied
contexts. In a 1999 analysis of interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys responsible for implementing the victim impact statement program in
South Australia, Edna Erez and Kathy Laster concluded that these actors “routinely
objectify and thereby minimize the victim’s injuries and impose an implicit
‘reasonable victim’ test to assess [victim impact statements].”125 Essayist and
Holocaust survivor Jean Améry resisted the work of truth commissions and their
“lofty ethical flights” precisely because he believed their institutional aspirations
towards narrating historical truth subsumed and utilized his individual need as a
victim, saying:
It is impossible for me to accept a parallelism that would have my path
run beside that of the fellows who flogged me with a horsewhip. I do
not want to become the accomplice of my torturers, rather I demand
that they negate themselves and in the negation coordinate with me.126
And, as Stacy Caplow notes, the special section of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct dealing with the duties of prosecutors mention nothing about prosecutors’
duties toward victims or witnesses of any kind,127 which she claims “perpetuate[s]
the traditional form of decision making in which the prosecutor assumes many
noble roles: gatekeeper protecting the defendant from false accusation or
unprovable charges; conservator of the law and the criminal justice system;
representative of the community; and defender of justice,” while undertaking to act
as a “benevolent guardian” for the victim, to whom he has no legal responsibility
for the decisions he makes in that capacity.128 It is the appropriateness of the legal
system’s structuring of a victim’s participation in the process at the heart of recent
controversies surrounding prohibitions against victims using the word “rape” to
describe their experience in rape prosecutions.129
In making these observations, I do not intend to suggest that the inherent
objectification of victim witnesses implicit in the institutional criminal justice
context is in some way blameworthy or unnecessary to the goals these institutions

125. Edna Erez & Kathy Laster, Neutralizing Victim Reform: Legal Professionals’
Perspectives on Victims and Impact Statements, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 530, 530 (1999).
126. Jean Améry, Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, in 2 JEAN AMÉRY: WERKE 128 (Irene
Heidelberger-Leonard ed., 2002), translated and discussed in Panu Minkkinen, Ressentiment
as Suffering: On Transitional Justice and the Impossibility of Forgiveness, 19 LAW &
LITERATURE 513, 524 (2007).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (amended 1996).
128. Stacy Caplow, What if There Is No Client? Prosecutors as “Counselors” of Crime
Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 20 (1998). Caplow also discusses the extent to which victims
are objectified as “types” in a manner that affects a prosecutor’s pursuit of a certain severity
of charge. Id. at 25.
129. See Randah Atassi, Comment, Silencing Tory Bowen: The Legal Implications of
Word Bans in Rape Trials, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215 (2009).
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are designed to serve. I merely note its existence for the purposes of understanding
the responses to institutional objectification potentially enfolded into such
narratives and the dual harms—individual and systemic—received by the
institutional listener of victim testimony.
For example, returning to the Safarini trial, Krishnaswamy’s testimony—which
he describes as reliving a nightmare which he had previously been unwilling to
do—also points to a critical feature of the structure of the violence and the system
in place to address it: the concentric objectifications and embodiments occasioned
first by Safarini and second by the act of testimony in a legal proceeding: “We have
amidst us,” he notes, “the 21 bodies that he slaughtered and over 100 were
wounded. Amongst the dead is my father.”130 Speaking to the court in this setting
he reduces his own father to a body rendered physically present by the need to
discuss the crime. “[T]hose bodies,” he continues, “now beg the two questions of
us: Why was my life so uselessly terminated or destroyed, and what are you and the
system going to do about it?”131 While opposing the defendant and the court as the
author of the harm and its possible remedy, it sets the victims into simultaneous
object-relationships with each of them.
Indeed, quite a few of the witnesses hint at the re-objectification entailed by the
fact of giving testimony. Sherene Pavan echoes this theme, noting “[w]hen Judge
Emmet Sullivan recently asked us to hand in victim impact statements, I wondered
why he wanted to put everyone through that harrowing experience of reliving that
day in public again. . . . [W]hy did he not let the matter rest without having us all
go through this,” and describes her participation as an attempt to honor the other
victims.132 By contrast, Gargi Dave, who was in law school herself at the time of
the trial—despite initially viewing the request to write a statement as like having
the carpet pulled out from under her—describes the testimony itself as ultimately
“healing” and says that “acknowledging how terrible, how intense the pain is . . .
really acknowledges how human we are.”133 She also describes her act of narrating
and participating in the hearing as her first-order experience of the event itself,
despite having suffered physical injury at the time: “I’m experiencing the intense
emotions of what it’s actually like to see what I didn’t experience then of people
being killed . . . the agony and the screaming that was described. People howling
and saying, ‘oh my God.’”134
Though frequently divided as to the purposes served by the pain of testimony,
most of the victim witnesses construct their roles in the trial as objects acted upon
by these two levels of agency. One victim suggests parity between her own
objectification and that of the defendant by noting that all of the media attention on
the victims immediately after the attacks “made us feel like criminals.”135
Krishnaswamy expresses his distress at the unavailability of the death penalty in
systemic terms: “From the viewpoint of the victim, it appears that clever lawyering
prevailed over common sense. In this case the facts are irrefutable, the evidence is

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 54.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 46.
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uncontrovertible [sic], the suffering immeasurable. But the Court seems to have
succumbed to legal maneuvering.”136 Another victim states belief that “[i]t was a
quirk of the law and that really your hands were tied. I was relieved to hear that, but
I still wanted to see you in action to see just exactly what kind of person you
were.”137 Viraf Daroga likewise describes himself as at the mercy of the judicial
system itself: “The thought that some day they may be released from prison and
that they may extract revenge or vendetta from my family worries me. Can I not
help feeling that?”138 Dasgupta’s husband states that “[w]riting this statement has
brought all the memories back. . . . I got so emotional many times and had to stop.
After more than 17 years it’s very, very painful,” and tells the court that he would
like to talk again to the psychologist who had treated his family immediately after
the attack while they were in Washington, D.C.139 Multiple victims attributed their
feelings of objectification to constant media surveillance, one describing her
physical deterioration as a result of that stress, and cites her marriage to a reporter
many years later as a return to autonomy.140 And multiple victims expressed in
general terms the difficulty of testifying at all.141
Related to the objectifying effects of wounding and testimony—and therefore
central to a great number of the narratives, unsurprisingly—was the question of
self-identification: to what extent the experience of the attack had produced a
fundamental shift of self into the identity of victim. Gopal Dadhirao puts it in the
starkest terms:
My name is Gopal Dadhirao. My wife was Krishna Gadde and I am a
victim. For 29 years, until the day of hijacking I worked hard to
become a scientist, a doctor, a husband, a father. These were the titles I
was working hard to. All that changed when this man changed that day
with his actions and I got a new title, the title of a victim.142
Later he explicitly states that he is “not a doctor . . . not a father . . . not a scientist,
but a victim.”143 Yet he also describes this identity as at least partially fluid,
something to be resisted, if not successfully, and that “[f]or the last 18 years I have
been working to get past the title ‘victim.’ When I wake up in the morning and I
look at my feet with three of the toes missing I’m reminded that I’m a victim.”144
He also rhetorically endows the court and himself with the capacity to preserve
self-identifications of future victims, expanding his narrative into the broader social

136. Id. at 56.
137. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 13, supra note 79, at 63.
138. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75. at 44.
139. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 13, supra note 79, at 52.
140. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 13, supra note 79, at 8; Safarini, Official
Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 43, 101–104, 125, 131.
141. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 13, supra note 79, at 27 (describing the act of
talking to the media as “something horrifying happening” with “the questions and answers
and lights and flashes”); see also id. at 37; Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra
note 75, at 54.
142. Safarini, Official Trial Transcript May 12, supra note 75, at 72.
143. Id. at 74.
144. Id. at 72.
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context, urging that while “there is nothing you or this court can do to this man that
will ever make things right or normal again” for himself,
if it could prevent a future Lockerbie, if it could prevent another World
Trade Center, we owe it to that 29 year old somewhere in the world
who is working hard to become a good doctor, a good scientist, to
become a good father and a husband from becoming yet another
victim.145
Similarly, Dwijal Dave describes himself as “a different person altogether” after the
attacks.146
By contrast Madhvi Bahaguna, who was the second witness after Dadhirao,
seems to explicitly challenge the negations of his testimony: “I did to continue to
live on until today,” she says, “And I got to become a mother of two beautiful
children. I was a daughter, and I am a daughter to my parents and a sister to my
brothers. I have continued from that date and I’m still a flight attendant.”147 Anu
Nemivant says she has “a real distaste for the word ‘victim,’ so I’ll call myself one
of the lucky passengers.”148 (She links this distinction, however, to the fact that she
“suffered no physical injury” and “unlike others, I did not lose anyone dear to
me.”)149 Gargi Dave says “yes, we can call ourselves victims, but we’re survivors
and we’re overcoming it. . . . I managed to get into law school despite the problems
I had. . . . And I’m not going to let this dominate who I am. It’s definitely a part of
who I am. But it’s made me . . . a better human being.”150
These examples underscore the role of the court as an arbiter of events—with
power to further wound or to allow healing—which came through powerfully in the
numerous references to the wounding nature of testimony itself, against the
backdrop of a rhetorical debate over self-identification as subject or object engaged
in by many of the victims. Though witnesses may direct large amounts of hostile
emotion at the defendant, they repeatedly do so against an awareness of themselves
as reacting to a system of institutional authority that acts upon them along with the
defendant himself. It is the collective represented by that system to which I will
turn in the next section.
Before doing so it is also worth noting that critical concerns over abstract ideas
like “victim talk”151 and “undifferentiated vengeance”152 fail to account for the
sheer complexity of harm as narrated in a victim impact statement. As the previous
examples demonstrate, the “victim identity” plays an important role in the impact
narratives, but witnesses confront and challenge this identity in a wide range of
ways. The judicial proceeding already inevitably objectifies victims in a host of
ways and the impact statement stages the tension between this objectification and

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 74.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 97–98.
Id. at 88.
See, e.g., Minow, supra note 9.
See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 3.
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resistance to it. Furthermore, the parallelism between defendant and victim as
objects of the system serves as a reminder of the communal concerns it is the
criminal sentencer’s duty to take into account.
III. CRIMINAL LAW AS A CULTURAL PRODUCT
A. The Notion of Communal Harm
In summarizing the sea change that occurred between Booth and Payne, Kenjii
Yoshino says, “[t]he Booth Court believes that the function of capital sentencing is
to truncate the triangular relationship between the state, the defendant, and the
victim so that it is a direct confrontation between the defendant and the state. The
Payne Court, in contrast, believes that the victim cannot be excluded from that
confrontation.”153 In separating the identity of the victim from the state so sharply,
arguments like these neglect the constitutive role of individual citizens—including
victims—in the “state” as it acts through the mechanism of the criminal justice
system. In reality, the harm felt by individual bodies implicates the collective
“body politic” both in a legal sense and in the sense that individual experience
shapes cultural experience, in ways that in turn affect the legal system.
With regard to the first claim, the role of the criminal law as a collective
expression of blameworthiness is enshrined in the Anglo-American tradition.
Though the nature of what constitutes “harm” has been a centuries-old debate,154 a
basic difference between a criminal and a civil wrong is that the focus of the former
is on condemnation through public sanction and the harm committed by the
defendant in and of itself, not simply an allocation of costs between private parties
as in civil actions.155 Intrinsic to the nature of condemnation is a communal

153. Yoshino, supra note 10, at 1883.
154. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill famously offered the classical liberal formulation for
the conditions under which a government may assert coercive authority over its subjects:
“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is . . . . to prevent harm to others.” On
Liberty, in J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 13 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989). Mill’s
formulation has been extremely influential across centuries of academic and legal debate,
famously invoked, for example, by H.L.A. Hart in his debate with Patrick Devlin on the use
of the laws to enforce morality. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965);
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). For a discussion of the impact of the
harm principle on American jurisprudence, see Steven D. Smith, Is the Harm Principle
Illiberal?, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 11–14 (2006).
155. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *2–3 (“[Private wrongs] are
an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals,
con[s]idered as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: [public
wrongs] are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole
community, considered as a community; and are di[s]tingui[s]hed by the har[sh]er
appellation of crimes and mi[s]deme[a]nors.” (emphasis in original)); G.W.F. HEGEL,
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 220, at 252 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet
trans., 1991) (arguing that, while revenge vindicates a victim’s subjective interest in “right,”
only a criminal prosecution in a court vindicates the “universal” moral interest); Peter
Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal
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understanding of what constitutes a “wrong.” More specifically, as Henry Hart put
it, “it is necessary to be able to say in good conscience in each instance in which a
criminal sanction is imposed for a violation of law that the violation was
blameworthy and, hence, deserving of the moral condemnation of the
community.”156 According to Hart a penal code serves as a “statement of those
minimum obligations of conduct which the conditions of community life impose
upon every participating member if community life is to be maintained and to
prosper . . . .”157 It should be noted that the role of the community in determining
the extent of punishment is crucial under both retributivist and utilitarian theories
of punishment. While the utilitarian position rejects moral blameworthiness as the
justification for punishment, it nonetheless takes it into account as a limiting
principle.158 Furthermore, the focus of a utilitarian system of punishment is
improvement of the overall welfare of the community through a reduction in crime
through means such as deterrence.159
When determining the character of an offense as either criminal or civil, courts
turn to the democratic branch to discern legislative intent,160 and when drafting
legislation, lawmakers in turn often solicit communal input on issues of moral harm
and wrongdoing.161 In the context of capital crimes, the Court’s landmark test for
the appropriateness of the death penalty in a given case turns on “community
values” and “evolving standards of human decency,”162 and has stated that “capital
punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive
conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered
and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1622 (1992) (“Criminal punishment can
be justified as a community act of self-defense that also expresses our moral condemnation
of what the criminal has done.”); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred
Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1337 (noting that the
criminal sanction may “be used to address only truly public harms-harms that damage a
collective, societal interest as opposed to a purely private interest that can be adequately
vindicated via civil liability”); Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in the Age of “MindReading,” 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2009) (“Only when its norms have been
rejected is a community justified in imposing punishment.”). But see Aaron Xavier Fellmeth,
Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2005)
(arguing that “it is no exaggeration to rank the distinction [between civil and criminal
punishment] among the least well-considered and principled in American legal theory”).
156. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
412 (1958) (emphasis in original).
157. Id. at 413.
158. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1836); HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968).
159. See also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through CostBenefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 786
(2005) (formulating the utilitarian conception of criminal punishment by positing “if the
conduct is a crime, the entire community should be better off by treating it as such. The
community benefits by the prevention of harm that is effected by punishing and stigmatizing
those who break the law”).
160. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
161. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) cmt. C (suggesting that sentencing
commissions will gain a “unique credibility” if they solicit a range of opinions from the
community at large).
162. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to
vindicate their wrongs.”163 And of course the protection to a defendant provided by
a jury of his peers turns on the notion of justice being best discerned by a “fair
cross section of the community.”164 The Court has repeatedly recognized the link
between the jury and the community it represents in setting it up as a safeguard
against disproportionate punishment. In Gregg, it observed that “jury sentencing
has been considered desirable in capital cases in order to ‘maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system’”165 and in Witherspoon v.
Illinois,166 it concluded that “a jury that must choose between life imprisonment
and capital punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—than express
the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.”167
The particular content of community norms to the function of criminal law is far
more than symbolically or even morally important, however. Marion Smiley argues
that even the concept of an individual’s causal responsibility for an action (which
she theorizes as itself a product of political and social considerations) varies
according to whether the victims of the action are viewed as members of the
individual’s community, “which is of course a relative matter.”168 Furthermore,
social science has demonstrated that people obey the law less due to fear of
criminal punishment than to a combination of normative social influence and
internal moral rules, the latter of which can be shaped by the former as children are
shaped as moral actors in part by their social worlds.169 And empirical work has
shown that intuitions about just punishment are in fact shared among common
citizens at an extremely nuanced level.170 Robinson and Kurzban argue that these
intuitions generate specific determinations of deserved punishment for
particularized crime, not simply floor or ceiling generalities about extremities of
justice and injustice.171 Robinson and Darley have demonstrated that, due to the

163. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); see also Stephen Gillers, Deciding
Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 54–56 (1980) (theorizing the retributive motivation behind
the death penalty as achieving not only “revenge” for the victim but a statement of society’s
displeasure at the defendant’s actions).
164. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
165. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190.
166. 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
167. Id.
168. MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY:
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 12 (1992).
169. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant
Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837,
854 (1990); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval
and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325
(1980); Raymond Paternoster & LeeAnn Iovanni, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived
Severity: A Reexamination, 64 SOC. FORCES 751, 769 (1986).
170. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in
Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007).
171. Id. at 1832–46. The authors note that these concepts of desert are not absolute but
relative, meaning that notions of desert do not flow from an understanding of a “magical”
connection between a certain act and an appropriate amount of punishment in the abstract,
but from a shared understanding of “the amount needed to set the offender in his appropriate
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strength of these shared intuitions about guilt, the deviation from these institutions
in assigning punishment comes with great systemic risks even according to
utilitarian models of punishment. These intuitions become even more effective at
preventing crime when it is perceived by the community to assign liability in “just”
proportion to the moral blameworthiness of the offender.172 Marshaling a great deal
of social science research, they assert that this is because “the ability of the criminal
justice system to harness the power of stigmatization, to avoid subversion and
vigilantism, to gain compliance in borderline cases, and to have a role in shaping
societal norms is directly related to its ability to gain moral credibility from those to
whom it applies.”173
This body of scholarship is critical to the discussion of victim narratives for two
reasons. First, it suggests that juries can handle determinations of guilt, and may
even consider nuanced differences in harm, such as those narrated by victim impact
statements, based on more or less communally shared understandings of harm—
and even across a range of social and racial perspectives.174 Second, it suggests that
to be systemically effective at preventing crime and instilling a sense of justice, the
law needs to accommodate the norm-generating social reality against which it
operates. As victim narratives exist in and shape this reality, the criminal justice
system must take them into account in order to serve its purposes.175
relative position on the continuum of deserved punishment.” Id. at 1835. Certain societies
may allow for more severe maximum or minimum punishments, but the intuitions about the
relative personal blameworthiness of offenders across whatever spectrum exists will not
change.
172. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2007).
173. Id. at 29–31 (citing, among other evidence, RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO,
ATTITUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 62–69 (1996);
Tilmann Betsch, Henning Plessner & Elke Schallies, The Value-Account Model of Attitude
Formation, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 251, 251–
52 (Geoffrey Haddock & Gregory R. Maio eds., 2004); Richard E. Petty & John T.
Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986)).
174. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 170, at 1857–65 (reviewing empirical literature
that suggests strongly shared intuitions of justice about punishment even across racial
demographic divides).
175. The restorative justice movement, of course, has argued for achieving community
healing after a crime by involving a plurality of stakeholders—defendants, victims, and the
community itself—in the process of punishment. The processes of restorative justice include
victim-offender mediation, sentencing circles, and group conferencing. See generally JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002). Some of the
principles of restorative justice have been used to support the inclusion of victim impact
evidence in a traditional sentencing hearing and some courts have been willing to take very
broad views of who constitutes a “victim” entitled to give testimony, sometimes allowing,
for example community members unrelated to the deceased victim to speak. See Logan,
supra note 7, at 161–64 (discussing examples of “community” impact evidence courts have
allowed, including testimony of callers to a local radio talk show). Whatever the merits and
liabilities of direct community participation in sentencing, I am more concerned here with
the relationship between particularized victim accounts of directly traceable harm and the
background community norms they shape, as opposed to allowing unrestrained community
input directly into the trial process.
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B. Individual and Cultural Memory of Crime
The remaining question is whether and how victim narratives do enter the
culture and affect the generation of social norms. This question turns in part on
what sociologists call “collective” or “cultural” memory, a concept first theorized
by early twentieth-century French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. Halbwachs
argued that the content of individual memory is dependent upon the social
framework within which it is constructed—that an individual memory of a
subjective experience will inevitably become shaped by its group context.176 Many
contemporary theorists go so far as to entirely reject the significance of individual
memory as such since it can be expressed only through the “cultural construction of
language . . . [in] socially structured patterns of recall.”177 For example, in an
analysis of women’s oral narratives about life during World War II, Penny
Summerfield examines the ways in which the narratives of individual women’s
experiences relate to public representations about women’s lives at the time, fitting
them into cultural frameworks such as “heroic” and “stoic” narratives.178 While it
has become uncontroversial to assume the social context in which a memory is
rehearsed has an impact on its content, this extreme collectivist view has come
under attack. Critics argue that this view neglects the extent to which “individual
and collective memories are often in tension” and that “the recollections of
individuals frequently challenge the construction of partial accounts designed
primarily to achieve collective unity.”179 A more complete model accounts for the
extent to which the memories of individuals, while shaped by collective memory,
reciprocally shape it in turn. It is this model that demonstrates the relevance of
individual victim’s stories to the cultural experience of crime.

176. MAURICE HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY (Francis J. Ditter, Jr. & Vida
Yazdi Ditter trans., 1980).
177. Michael Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in MEMORY
DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 346, 347 (Daniel
L. Schacter ed., 1995); see also Wulf Kansteiner, Finding Meaning in Memory: A
Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies, 41 HISTORY & THEORY 179, 185
(2002) (“The very language and narrative patterns that we use to express memories, even
autobiographical memories, are inseparable from the social standards of plausibility and
authenticity that they embody.”).
178. See generally PENNY SUMMERFIELD, RECONSTRUCTING WOMEN’S WARTIME LIVES
(1998).
179. Anna Green, Individual Remembering and ‘Collective Memory’: Theoretical
Presuppositions and Contemporary Debates, ORAL HISTORY, Autumn 2004, at 35, 41; see
also Susan A. Crane, Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory, 102 AM.
HISTORICAL REV. 1372, 1381 (1997) (arguing that “collective memory is itself an expression
of historical consciousness that derives from individuals, and has only recently . . . found one
kind of expression in national or collective histories—this being only one possibility, not an
exhaustive depletion of the concept”); Michael G. Kenny, A Place for Memory: The
Interface Between Individual and Collective History, 41 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HISTORY
420, 431 (1999) (“Awareness of [the history of Native Canadians forced into the Residential
School System] both derives from and helps to create the memories of individuals. It was,
after all, individuals who . . . enjoyed, survived, or simply endured the schools.”).

1282

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:1247

Utilizing case studies ranging from the colonial experiences of Australian
aborigines to the notion of the “survivor syndrome” first developed to describe
Holocaust victims, Michael Kenny has brought psychological and historical
literature together to chart the interaction between personal and collective history
“whereby autobiography becomes articulated to influential cultural narratives.”180
Jeffrey Olick theorizes that once “memory of . . . personally traumatic experiences
is externalized and objectified as narrative . . . it is no longer a purely individual
psychological matter” and therefore, for example, the trauma of what happened at
Auschwitz “will not disappear with the death of the last survivor; . . . Auschwitz
remains a trauma for the narratives of modernity and morality, among others.”181
Individual memories may shape cultural memory in ways that endure, though their
individuality may be threatened by the press of cultural narratives already in place.
Pierre Nora distinguished the concept of cultural memory as a repository of
shared experience from that of “history” insofar as the former relates to facts as
they happened and the latter to a subjective account of the details historians
privilege.182 Theorists of cultural memory have noted the importance of tangible
and visual objects such as memorials existing in the present, as a means of
accessing the factual past, which produces a problem similar to the signification
problems faced by an individual witness testifying to past pain. Because memory
extends beyond its present artifacts it is necessarily in flux; when we reproduce it
we wind up with only, as Richard Terdiman calls it, “a present past.”183
The duality between cultural memory and history has an obvious coordinate in
the realm of legal discourse: upholding the freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law
depends upon adherence to a history of “legal truth” that—in order to protect the
procedural rights of defendants and for various other reasons—must at times part
ways with “factual truth.” (A majority of the population, for example, believes the
outcome of the O.J. Simpson trial to exemplify this dynamic.)184 Yet the two
valences are interdependent in important ways. As Marita Sturken notes,
Personal memory, cultural memory, and history do not exist within
neatly defined boundaries. Rather, memories and memory objects can
move from one realm to another, shifting meaning and context. Thus,
personal memories can sometimes be subsumed into history, and
elements of cultural memory can exist in concert with historical
narratives.185

180. Kenny, supra note 179, at 437.
181. Jeffrey K. Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, 17 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
333, 345 (1999) (citation omitted).
182. Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,
REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1989, at 7, 7–24.
183. RICHARD TERDIMAN, PRESENT PAST: MODERNITY AND THE MEMORY CRISIS 3 (1993).
184. See, e.g., 10 Years After Simpson Verdict: Issues of Race Still Figure Prominently in
NEWS
(June
6,
2004),
Public
Opinion,
NBC
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5139346/ns/dateline_nbc/ (finding that 77% of respondents
believed Simpson guilty of murder).
185. MARITA STURKEN, TANGLED MEMORIES: THE VIETNAM WAR, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC,
AND THE POLITICS OF REMEMBERING 5–6 (1997).
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A particular striking example of this effect, which Sturken provides, is the extent to
which World War II movies have subsumed the stories of individual soldiers into a
“general script.”186
In her work on cultural memory in the context of the Vietnam War and the
AIDS epidemic, Sturken discusses how the instability of memory “allows for
renewal and redemption without letting the tension of the past in the present fade
away.”187 Constitutive of this process are individual testimonial acts—patches
contributed to the AIDS quilt, individual memorials left by the Vietnam Memorial
on the National Mall, and so forth. Sturken emphasizes the prominence of trauma
in producing cultural memory as a mutually reinforcing cycle: on the one hand
memory functions as a tool for healing, yet the site of the wounded body becomes
an important means of generating memory.188
The relevant cultural memory of trauma that forms the backdrop for the criminal
justice system, then, is the shared memory of crime itself, frequently discussed at
particular historical moments in the material, phenomenological language of
“epidemic.”189 In the late 1970s an increase in crime was accompanied by a
corresponding increase in fear of crime, but at the national level this fear did not
drop at the same rate as crime levels themselves.190 Through the proliferation of

186. For further discussion of the relationship between scripted memory and actual
memory in a World War II context, see Marita Sturken, Absent Images of Memory:
Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese Internment, in PERILOUS MEMORIES: THE ASIAPACIFIC WARS 35–36 (T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White & Lisa Yoneyam eds., 2001) (“For
Americans, the Asia Pacific War produced several image-icons, most notably the raising by
U.S. soldiers of the American flag at Iwo Jima . . . and the image of the mushroom cloud
from the atomic blast rising over Hiroshima. Other images are generic: men running as boats
smoke and sink at Pearl Harbor, American soldiers in the trenches in tropical locations, and
Japanese planes crashing into the sea. The sources of these images of history are many and
are as likely to be the screen images of Hollywood films such as Thirty Seconds over Tokyo
(1944), Guadalcanal Diary (1943), Sands of Iwo Jima (1949), or From Here to Eternity
(1953) as documentary footage.” (citations omitted)).
187. STURKEN, supra note 185, at 17.
188. Sturken claims, for instance, that
[a]ttempts to rescript the Vietnam War have been as much about healing, with
its bodily metaphors, as they have been about smoothing over the disruptions of
the war’s narratives. At the same time, the desire to memorialize the AIDS
epidemic while it is still occurring reveals the need to find healing amid death.
Id. at 16.
189. See, e.g., WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S
TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998); Faye Bowers, U.S. Fights a Border-Crime
‘Epidemic’: Law-Enforcement Agencies Find New Ways to Coordinate Their Efforts to Stem
the Rise of Violence on the Border with Mexico, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 25 2007),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0425/p02s01-ussc.html; Mark Scheer, Crime ‘Epidemic’
Decried in City of Niagara Falls, NIAGARA GAZETTE (Oct. 4, 2010), http://niagaragazette.com/local/x145227969/Crime-epidemic-decried-in-city-of-Niagara-Falls.
190. FRED DUBOW, EDWARD MCCABE & GAIL KAPLAN, REACTIONS TO CRIME: A
CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1979); see also FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998) (arguing that legislative and popular
perceptions of youth violence created a crisis where none existed); Ralph B. Taylor &
Margaret Hale, Criminology: Testing Alternative Models of Fear of Crime, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
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“true crime” stories throughout the culture, the media capitalizes on and shapes this
shared sense of vulnerability.191 Jonathan Simon makes the case that governance
since the 1960s has used this disembodied cultural fear to make dramatic
encroachments into the day-to-day lives of citizens at all levels of society by
drawing analogies to crime in its regulation of schools, families, workplaces, and
communities.192 He argues that this resulted in the redefinition of the “ideal citizen”
as a crime victim and calls for citizens to become more actively engaged in the
management of risk, to free themselves from what he considers a pattern of
domination by the government.193
Simon briefly addresses the novel role for actual crime victims in this new era,
criticizing the 1994 amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
allowing victims to speak at sentencing hearings. Simon derides these measures as
state-sponsored ways to reproduce a certain kind of victim voice that
has been promoted by the victim’s rights movement, one of extremity,
anger, and vengeance. . . . To the extent that activist victims define the
victim subject position more generally, lawmaking will systematically
favor vengeance and ritualized rage over crime prevention and fear
reduction.194
What Simon does not clarify, however, is how—even if we accept the overarching
thrust of his thesis concerning the policy motivations behind the act—a general
right for victims to be heard privileges a “certain kind of victim voice.” Simon,
along with many other critics of victim impact statements, makes the assumption
that the individual victim’s voice necessarily enfolds into a state-generated
collective narrative that seeks to gain power through instilling fear. He seems to
ignore the potential effects of individual memories in disrupting collective
narrative, imposing on all victims the seemingly immutable identity of “activist
victim” whose motivations must be aligned with that of the state. Indeed, if he is
correct that the state has consciously constructed a false “victim voice” as an agent
of its own power, it becomes all the more important to hear individual voices of
legitimate victims.
To be sure, the evidence suggests a traumatic cultural experience of crime that
seems to exceed the sum of individual experiences—at least insofar as it persists in
the imagination disproportionate to the extent of its recurrence in reality.
Furthermore, the shaping of this fear by various external authorities such as
lawmakers and the media creates a kind of “history” of crime of the sort that
theorists oppose to the more diversified composite of cultural memory. These
selective histories have the capacity to generate biased and stereotypical
assumptions about what crime looks like and one-dimensional ideas about the

CRIMINOLOGY 151, 188 (1986) (measuring the loose linkage between crime and fear and
finding that “[c]rime was weaker as a predictor of fear of crime than perceptions of locale
and sociodemographics”).
191. ZIMRING, supra note 190.
192. See generally SIMON, supra note 8.
193. Id. at 136.
194. Id. at 106.
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identity of the “criminal.”195 To the extent that the criminal justice system allows
for more individuated expressions of victimization, however, it actually allows for
some counterbalance to these forces, and for some of the salutary benefits of
participatory cultural memory. Furthermore, to the extent that individual narratives
have the potential to shape cultural memory outside of formal legal institutions,
those institutions become increasingly likely to enforce a “history” even farther
removed from the shared experience of the culture at large.
CONCLUSION
If it is true that the legitimacy of the criminal justice system to a given populace
flows from its representation of socially shared norms of justice, then formal
criminal law institutions, if they are to do their job, cannot be selective about the
narratives they consider in the vindication of these shared norms. Personal
memories of individual harms, in their aggregate, already combine to shape the
collective memory of a culture. I have shown how the structural features of the
victim impact statement enable these harms to be translated to institutional listeners
in the context of a sentencing hearing. Through strategies such as the idiosyncratic
use of chronology and symbolic objects, victims can negotiate some of the barriers
to articulation and render their suffering “present” as an object for the sentencing
body to consider, in a manner otherwise impossible. Furthermore, the Safarini
sentencing demonstrates that diversity of victim “voices” in existence. Rather than
speaking about these voices as monolithic cries for “vengeance” or exercises in
“victim speak,” it is more useful to scrutinize them on an individual basis to ensure
the relevance of the harm they narrate for the purposes of sentencing. By
continuing to include these narratives in its proceedings the legal system—though
inescapably and, to a large degree, necessarily objectifying to its participants—can

195. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses,
95 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (1997) (criticizing the “engraft[ing of] an essentialist
dichotomy of good-bad moral character on the racial identity of young black men”); Debra
Lyn Bassett, The Rural Venue, 57 ALA. L. REV. 941, 944 (2006) (“[I]nstead of viewing
someone as a complex whole, complete with inconsistencies and ambiguities, stereotyping
permits instant slotting—people are slotted into little boxes and ascribed particular
characteristics and qualities without examination, reflection, or analysis. . . . If left
unchecked, these biases can result in erroneous and unfair impressions, and in the legal
system, can result in injustice.” (footnotes omitted)); Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in
Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 32 (1998) (noting “stereotype dichotomies (e.g., white/black; good/bad)”); Stephanie
Lasker, Sex and the City: Zoning “Pornography Peddlers and Live Nude Shows,” 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1139, 1181 (2002) (noting dichotomies of “madonna/whore, white/dark,” and
“good/bad”); Caroline Rogus, Conflating Women’s Biological and Sociological Roles: The
Ideals of Motherhood, Equal Protection, and the Implications of the Nguyen v. INS Opinion,
5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 803, 823 (2003) (“[P]rosecutors and defense attorneys rely on the
dichotomy of good/bad mother . . . in their portrayals of female defendants who have abused
or killed their children.”); Sherrine M. Walker & Christopher D. Wall, Feminist
Jurisprudence: Justice and Care, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 255, 264 (1997) (noting such
dichotomies as “male/female, good/bad, right/wrong” and that “[l]aw is particularly
susceptible to this polarized way of thinking”).
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nonetheless bring before its sentencing bodies a rendition of harm that resembles
and engages the harm as experienced in the non-legal social settings from which
our moral norms emerge. This approach will retain narratives of actual harm as a
buttress against the constructed stereotypes that offend the dignity of all actors in
the system.

